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Abstract
We investigate the trade-off between the robustness against random and targeted removal of nodes
from a network. To this end we utilize the stochastic block model to study ensembles of infinitely
large networks with arbitrary large-scale structures. We present results from numerical two-objective
optimization simulations for networks with various fixed mean degree and number of blocks. The
results provide strong evidence that three different blocks are sufficient to realize the best trade-off
between the two measures of robustness, i.e. to obtain the complete front of Pareto-optimal networks.
For all values of the mean degree, a characteristic three block structure emerges over large parts of
the Pareto-optimal front. This structure can be often characterized as a core-periphery structure,
composed of a group of core nodes with high degree connected among themselves and to a periphery of
low-degree nodes, in addition to a third group of nodes which is disconnected from the periphery, and
weakly connected to the core. Only at both extremes of the Pareto-optimal front, corresponding to
maximal robustness against random and targeted node removal, a two-block core-periphery structure
or a one-block fully random network are found, respectively.
1 Introduction
The theoretical investigation of complex networks has proven to be a valuable tool for the study of many
real-world systems [1–6]. One important aspect is how the topological properties of networks are linked
to their function and robustness [7, 8]. Robustness is defined as the correct functioning in the presence
of disturbances, and it is a desired property of many empirical network systems. The robustness of
networks to topological disturbances is a very active field of research [8–11], since it is often assumed
that it is a necessary ingredient for higher-order forms of robustness associated with specific network
dynamics [12–16].
One popular way to address topological robustness is by removing nodes from a given network and
then analyzing how connected the network remains as function of the number of nodes removed [7,17,18].
In this way, the problem of robustness is mapped to the classical phenomenon of percolation, and the
formation of a giant component in the remaining network after the node removals.
Recent studies focused on the optimization of the topological robustness of networks, when a given
set of constraints are imposed [11, 19–25]. Most recent works have focused on optimization according to
different robustness criteria, such as targeted attacks [11, 25, 26] and random failure [25, 26]. However,
most real systems are subject to simultaneous types of perturbations, which individually require different,
and thus competing strategies to mitigate failure. In order to properly access the inherent trade-offs in
such situations, one needs to combine multiple robustness criteria. A standard technique is to chose a
weighted sum of the relevant criteria as the objective function to be minimized or maximized. However,
such an approach can be ineffective if the goal is to map all possible trade-off values between these
objectives. In addition, it also bears the difficulty to define properly scaled objective functions for each
criterion, such that a weighted sum really reflects the relative importance the multiple criteria.
In order to avoid such issues we use a multi-objective optimization approach [27–30], where a complete
set of Pareto-optimal solutions is directly obtained. The two objectives we focus on are the topological
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robustness of networks against random and targeted removal of nodes. These two types of robustness are
known to be in a trade-off relation, where increasing the robustness with respect to one type of removal
is likely to decrease the other [18, 25, 26]. In particular, it has been recently shown that in absence of
any constraints other than a fixed average degree, the optimization of robustness against random failure
leads to a core-periphery structure, where most nodes are connected to a core group, possessing a high
average degree, which is also internally connected [25]. Although being maximally robust against random
failure, this core-periphery topology is minimally robust against targeted attacks, since the removal of
the few core node immediately leads to the vanishing of the giant component. This robustness-fragility
duality is a common feature of real networks with heterogeneous structure; a famous example of which
is the Internet [31].
In order to investigate this multi-objective optimization scenario, we follow Ref. [25] and focus on
large-scale topological features, as parametrized by a stochastic block model [32,33]. This parametrization
allows for arbitrary large-scale mixing patterns, such as assortativity, dissortativity, community structure,
core-peripheries, etc., as well as arbitrary local degree distributions. This model is also convenient,
since it allows the exact computation of the percolation properties of the system in the limit of large
networks [25,34].
By analyzing the Pareto-optimal fronts according to the two robustness criteria, we observe that a
minimal number of three blocks is sufficient to obtain the optimal fronts, and that in most cases the best
trade-off is realized by a hybrid structure composed of a core-periphery and a third “secluded” group,
which is strongly connected internally and marginally connected to the core nodes. The two-block core-
periphery of Ref. [25] and the fully random network are recovered at the two extremes of the Pareto
fronts, for maximum robustness against random and targeted node removal, respectively.
This paper is organized as follows. In Sec. 2.1, we define the stochastic block model and in Sec. 2.2
our robustness criteria. In Sec. 2.3, the evolutionary multi-objective optimization algorithm is described
briefly. Sec. 3 presents the results of the optimization for several parameter choices, including the Pareto-
optimal fronts and the resulting topologies. In Sec. 4, we finalize with an overall discussion.
2 Materials and Methods
2.1 Stochastic block model
The stochastic block model defines an ensemble of random networks, in which nodes belong to different
groups (also called “blocks”), and the probability of an edge existing between nodes is a function of the
block membership of each node. Each block holds a fraction nr of the N nodes of the whole network,
where r ∈ [1, B] enumerates these blocks and B is the total number of blocks, such that ∑Br=1 nr = 1.
Following Ref. [33], each of the B blocks is characterized by an independent degree distribution prk, which
specifies the fraction of nodes with degree k in block r.
The connections between the blocks are described with a matrix e, where the elements ers specify the
number of half-edges per node in block r connecting to nodes in block s. For simplicity of notation, the
diagonal elements err encode twice the number of edges per node within block r.
In the framework of the stochastic block model, the network structure becomes locally tree-like when
the number of nodes Nnr inside each block is sufficiently large. Since the probability of an edge existing
between any two nodes of groups r and s scales as is Eers/NnrNns ∼ O(1/N), with nr ∼ 1/B and ers ∼
1/B2, the probability of an edge existing between any two chosen neighbours will become vanishingly
small as N →∞. Therefore, since local substructures such as triangles are not generated by the model,
predictions based on block model calculations can only be accurate for (large) tree-like networks without
these local substructures. However, global and meso-scale properties such as community structure [33],
assortativity [35], bipartite, core-periphery structures [25], or any other arbitrary mixing pattern are well
captured.
2
Each block of the network can in principle have an arbitrary degree distribution prk. However, in this
work we restrict the degree distribution of each block to be a modified Poisson degree distribution,
pMPk = (1− δk,0)
κk
(eκ − 1)k! , (1)
where δij is the Kronecker delta function. Thereby nodes with zero degree (k = 0) are explicitly ex-
cluded, since they can never belong to the giant component. In contrast to a regular Poisson distribution
pPk = κ
ke−κ/k!, where the mean degree is directly given by κ, the mean degree of the modified Poisson
distribution is given by 〈k〉MP = κ/(1 − e−κ), which is always bigger than κ. In particular, the mean
degree cannot be less than one, 〈k〉MP ≥ 1.
It is important to note that although the use of the modified Poisson distribution as displayed in
Eq. (1) may seem like a strong imposition on the network structure, in reality it is not. A large variety of
nearly-arbitrary degree distributions of the complete network can be obtained by composing many blocks
with different sizes and average degrees.
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Figure 1: Giant connected component of a Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random network with a Poisson
(dashed green) and modified Poisson (solid red) degree distribution as function the average
mean degree of the network. The inset shows the regular and modified Poisson distribution for a
mean degree of 〈k〉 = 1.2 with the same color coding.
The percolation properties of a random network with the modified Poisson degree distribution of
Eq. (1) differ slightly from an Erdo˝s-Re´nyi network, i.e. a random network with a regular Poisson distri-
bution. In the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi network the percolation transition where a macroscopic connected component
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emerges as a function of the mean degree occurs at 〈k〉CP = 1. In the case of the modified Poisson distri-
bution, the transition is shifted to 〈k〉CMP = e/(e − 1) ≈ 1.58, as can be seen in Fig. 1. This is a direct
consequence of the fact that no nodes with degree k = 0 are allowed in the later case. For a modified
Poisson network to have low mean degree, 〈k〉MP ' 1, a large fraction of nodes needs to have degree one.
In order to achieve this, many of the k − 1 nodes form pairs and are thus isolated from the rest of the
network. Additionally, the number of nodes with degree greater than one is strongly reduced compared
to the regular Poisson distribution (see inset of Fig. 1). This prohibits the existence of a macroscopic
connected component if the mean degree is close to one (〈k〉MP ' 1). Only when the fraction of nodes
with k = 1 diminishes, a macroscopic giant component can form. In this case, the nonexistence of discon-
nected k = 0 nodes results in larger connected components in general and leads to the stronger increase
of the size of the giant components as can be seen in Fig. 1.
Apart from the degree distribution of each block, prk, more parameters need to be specified in order
to define a realization of a block model ensemble. These are the total number of blocks B, the relative
size of each block nr, the mean degree of each block 〈k〉r, as well as the edges connecting the blocks given
by ers. These parameters are, however, not completely independent as the relative sizes nr of all blocks
must add up to one,
∑
r nr = 1, and the sum of all the edges incident to one block is related to its mean
degree, 〈k〉r =
∑
s ers/nr. Since we will always consider networks with a given total mean degree 〈k〉,
the following constraint will need to be fulfilled, 〈k〉 = ∑r nr〈k〉r.
2.2 Node removal and robustness
Failure in networks is modeled by removing a finite fraction q of nodes from the network. We will consider
two different strategies for selecting which nodes are removed. The first is random removal where the
nodes to be removed are selected purely randomly. The second is targeted removal where nodes with
higher degree are more likely to be removed.
Both types of failures are inspired by real-world technical networks. Random removal is considered
to model fatigue of parts or other random influences. Targeted removal is inspired by the fact that
highly loaded nodes are more likely to fail or, in the context of critical infrastructure, malicious damage
is preferably brought to important nodes.
In the context of block models, where we only model representative nodes in an statistical ensemble,
we employ a slight variation of the targeted removal which was also used in Ref. [25]. The targeted
criterion is only applied to the selection of blocks where the fraction of nodes to be removed from block
r is proportional to e〈k〉r and thus increases with the mean degree of the block. However, within each
block no further targeted removal of nodes is performed and nodes are removed at random. In case of all
blocks having the same mean degree targeted removal is identical to random node removal.
As a measure of robustness of a network we use the size of the macroscopic component S(q) after
a finite fraction q of nodes has been removed. Instead of focusing on the robustness when removing a
single fraction q, all possible values 0 ≤ q ≤ 1 are considered to obtain a sensible measure for the overall
robustness of a network. Therefore, we define the robustness as it was proposed in Ref. [11] as
R = 2
∫ 1
0
S (q) dq , (2)
where the factor of 2 serves to adjust the range of R to be [0, 1]. The limiting case R = 0 is achieved
by networks without a macroscopic component, even when no nodes are removed at all. The opposite
limiting case of R = 1 requires a fully connected network where S(q) = 1− q.
Following Ref. [25] using the generating function formalism [36] the size of the macroscopic component
is calculated using ur, which is the probability that a node in block r is not connected to the macroscopic
component via one of its neighbors. These probabilities for all blocks have to fulfill a system of B
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self-consistent coupled equations:
ur =
∑
s
mrs
[
1 +
φs
κs
(
g′0,s (us)− 1
)]
, (3)
where mrs ≡ ers/nrκr is the fraction of edges in block r leading to block s, nr and 〈k〉r are the relative
number of nodes and mean degree of block r, respectively, and g0,r(z) =
∑
k p
r
kz
k is the generating
function of the degree distribution of block r and g′0,r(z) =
∂
∂z g0,r(z) is its derivative. φr ∈ [0, 1] is the
fraction of nodes not removed from block r. The φr have to be chosen in accordance with the node
removal strategy, for example, φr = φ for random removal or φr ∝ e−〈k〉r for targeted removal. Since
the total fraction of removed nodes is given by q, the φr need to satisfy the relation q = 1 −
∑
s φsns.
Due to this requirement, the φr for targeted removal need to be determined by numerically solving
0 = 1−q−∑r nr exp(−〈k〉r(1−x)/x) for x and using the solution x∗ to get φr = exp(−〈k〉r(1−x∗)/x∗).
The solutions of these equations for all ur allows for the calculation of the size of the giant connected
component S(q),
S(q) =
∑
s
nsφs [1− g0,s (us)] . (4)
At this point, a few remarks about the interpretation of the value of S(q) should be made. Since we
are parametrizing the system with intensive quantities (ers, nr, ur, etc.) which specify fractions of nodes
and edges in infinitely large systems, we cannot differentiate between the existence of single or multiple
macroscopic components for a given value of S(q). In other words, if two macroscopic components are
connected by a single edge (or more generally, any intensive number of edges) the probability of edges
between them vanishes in the infinite size limit. Thus, this situation cannot be distinguished from two
truly disconnected macroscopic components where no edges exists between the two components. For
the purposes of this work, we consider this issue to be unimportant, and we focus on the existence of
macroscopic components in the more abstract sense as given by the value of S(q) directly.
For each node removal strategy, Eqs. (3) have to be solved for all q in order to calculate the robustness
R of a specific block model ensemble. In our case, this leads to two different measures of robustness,
RRandom and RTargeted, for random and targeted node removal, respectively.
2.3 Evolutionary optimization
In order to consider both robustness measures, RTargeted and RRandom, at once, we utilize a multi-
objective [27–30] evolutionary optimization [37, 38] algorithm. Unlike in the optimization of a single
objective, where it is always possible to state if a certain solution A is better, worse or equally good
compared to a solution B, this is not necessarily possible in multi-objective optimization. If a solution A
performs better than a different solution B in one objective, but worse in a second objective, no statement
is possible which of the solutions is better. Only if solution A is better than B in at least one objective
and not worse in any objective it can be considered generally better and it is then said that A dominates
B. Sets in which no solution dominates any other solution are called non-dominating. In general, a multi-
objective optimization will not result in a single best solution but in a set of non-dominating solutions
which ideally is close to the best possible set of non-dominating solutions, the Pareto-optimal front. These
non-dominating sets are very useful to study the trade-off relation between the robustness RTargeted and
RRandom and their relation to the structure of optimal networks.
The algorithm we use here is the so called S-metric selection evolutionary multi-objective optimization
algorithm (SMS-EMOA) [39]. It is a population based evolutionary stochastic search algorithm which
does not utilize any gradient information and is well suited for non-convex and noisy optimization prob-
lems. The algorithm does not optimize the objectives directly but instead maximizes the hypervolume in
objective-space dominated by the population and bound by a reference point. In the present case of two
objectives, the hypervolume is given by the area under the Pareto-curves as, for example, shown in Fig. 7.
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At each iteration the solution whose removal leads to the lowest decrease in the dominated hypervolume
is removed from the population and a new solution is generated by recombination and mutation (for more
details see [40]).
Repeating the steps of removing the least contributing solution and generating a new solution not
only shifts the solution set closer to the Pareto-optimal front but also leads to a broad distribution along
the front, two desired properties of an optimal set of solutions.1
For each optimization run, we fix the number of blocks B and the mean degree of the complete
network, 〈k〉. Each block has a modified Poisson distribution as its degree distribution (cf. Eq. (1)), but
the average mean degree of each block can vary. Therefore, the free variables subject to optimization,
i.e. the search parameters, are the relative size of each block, nr, the mean degree of each block, κr,
and the entries in the matrix containing edges within and between the blocks, ers. With the sum rules
and constraints stated at the end of Section 2.1, this results in 12B(B + 1) + B − 2 independent search
parameters.
3 Results
3.1 Trade-off curves
In Fig. 7 we show robustness values obtained from different optimizations for several numbers of blocks
(B = 2, 3, 4, 5), but all with a fixed mean degree of 〈k〉 = 2.5. The Pareto-optimal fronts for optimizations
with B = 3, 4, and 5 blocks match exactly. Only the B = 2 result deviates and yields lower robustness
over large parts of the Pareto-optimal front.
The network structures corresponding to the Pareto-optimal solutions for B = 3, 4, and 5 blocks are
also identical (not shown) 2. The same behavior was found for other values of the mean degree 〈k〉, where
the results for B ≥ 3 were identical and deviations were only observed for B = 2.
This leads to the conclusion that three blocks are sufficient to describe networks which are maximally
robust against random and targeted node removal. At both extremes of the Pareto-optimal fronts all
curves coincide, which means that for optimizing only with respect to one objective (i.e. single-objective
optimization), B ≤ 2 is sufficient to achieve maximal robustness (see Section 3.2). This is in accordance
with the results of Ref. [25], where single-objective optimization was performed, and a B = 2 core-
periphery and a B = 1 fully random structures were found as optimum for random and targeted node
removal, respectively. This is also consistent with the findings of Valente et al. [26] who showed two-
and three-peak degree distributions to be optimal when minimizing percolation thresholds of networks
subject to random and targeted removal of nodes.
The Pareto-optimal fronts of optimized block model networks with three blocks (B = 3) and a mean
degree 〈k〉 between 1.5 and 3.5 are shown in Fig. 8. As intuitively expected, the general trend where the
robustness increases with the mean degree is observed.
For small values of the mean degree, 〈k〉 . 2.5, the two types of robustness are in strong trade-off
relation: Increasing the robustness against targeted removal strongly decreases the robustness against
random removal (and vice-versa).
Pareto-optimal solutions of networks with 〈k〉 . 2 and with the highest robustness against random
removal are always found to be most fragile with respect to targeted removal, i.e. at RTargeted = 0.
But for 〈k〉 > 2, networks with the maximal value of RRandom shift to have a finite robustness against
targeted removal, RTargeted > 0. In this case, networks with lower robustness against targeted removal
are not accessible via the multi-objective optimization, since they are not Pareto-optimal (i.e. they are
1 For completeness, we state the parameters used for the SMS-EMOA: A population size of 50 is used, the crossover
probability is pc = 1, the crossover distribution parameter is ηm = 20, the mutation probability is pm = 1, and the mutation
distribution parameter is ηc = 15.
2Two structures with different B values are considered identical when their structural entropy is the same. See Sec. 3.2
for more details.
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Figure 2: Pareto-optimal fonts of robustness against targeted and random removal of nodes
for mean degree 〈k〉 = 2.5 and various number of blocks.
dominated by the solutions with maximal RRandom, see Refs. [27–30]). However, they can be found by
performing an optimization with the value of RTargeted fixed, and such results are shown as the smaller
gray symbols in Fig. 8. The Pareto optimal front together with these additional solutions form the whole
trade-off curve for each 〈k〉.
With increasing mean degree, the trade-off curves become very flat, indicating that a slight sacrifice
on the robustness with respect to random removal yields a great enhancement in the robustness against
targeted removal. Additionally, the curves increasingly approach the diagonal where RRandom = RTargeted,
which means that there are solutions which are equally good in both measures.
In general RRandom is always greater or equal to RTargeted, and for 〈k〉 & 2.5, the Pareto-optimal
fronts extend to the diagonal. In random networks, nodes with high degree are important for the size
of the giant component since they naturally are more likely to connect different components. Due to
this, a removal mechanism targeting high degree nodes is able to degrade the giant component easily by
removing a relatively small amount of high degree nodes. Therefore, making the degree distribution of a
7
00.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
R
R
a
n
d
om
RTargeted
〈k〉 = 1.5
〈k〉 = 2.0
〈k〉 = 2.5
〈k〉 = 3.0
〈k〉 = 3.5
Figure 3: Pareto-optimal fronts of RRandom versus RTargeted for optimal block model networks
with B = 3 and for various mean degrees (colored symbols). For 〈k〉 > 2, the smaller gray
symbols to the left of each Pareto front indicate solutions which maximize RRandom for fixed RTargeted
but which are not Pareto-optimal (see main text).
network narrow should increase the robustness against targeted removal since there are less high-degree
nodes. In a block model with several blocks a narrow degree distribution implies that all blocks have the
same mean degree 〈k〉r = 〈k〉. Since, in this work, targeted removal only differentiates between blocks
but not between nodes inside the block, targeted and random removal are identical if all blocks have the
same mean degree. As a consequence, the robustness values are then equal, RRandom = RTargeted.
In contrast, for 〈k〉 . 2.0, the Pareto-optimal fronts do not extend to the diagonal, which is a
consequence of the percolation properties of fully random B = 1 networks (cf. Section 2.1). For low
mean degrees, the giant connected component of a fully random network is very small even without node
removal (q = 0). Due to the steep increase of the giant component with increasing mean degree (cf.
Fig. 1), it is beneficial to have two blocks with differing mean degree, one higher and the other lower
than the total average mean degree 〈k〉. The block having a mean degree greater than 〈k〉, also has a
substantial larger giant component, while the giant component of the other block is still small (or even
zero). Therefore, the argument presented above for 〈k〉 & 2.5, where a finite giant component at q = 0
always exists, is not effective for 〈k〉 . 2. It is always beneficial to have (at least) two blocks in order to
have increase the size of the giant component for q = 0.
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3.2 Network structures
In our approach, the number of blocks B is set a priori and kept fixed during a single optimization
procedure. However, networks with different values of B could have equivalent topologies. This can
happen if one or more blocks have a vanishing size nr and mean degree 〈k〉r, or when two or more blocks
can be merged together without altering the ensemble of generated networks.
For a clearer visualization and analysis of block model structures, we reduce the number of blocks
by removing insignificant blocks and by merging multiple blocks into one if they are equivalent. For two
blocks to be equivalent, we require that the entropy of the merged and the original network ensembles
differ by a very small amount. The entropy of the stochastic block model ensemble is simply the logarithm
of the total number of networks which can be generated given a specific parametrization, i.e. choices of
nr and ers. The entropy is a signature of the ensemble, and determines how random it is. If the entropy
remains the same after two blocks are merged into one, this means that these two groups correspond
simply to an arbitrary subdivision of a larger group, and they do not in fact constrain the topology in
any way. The entropy of block model networks is calculated as described in Ref. [41]. We emphasize that,
since the topologies in this case are in fact equivalent, the effect of the merging process on the robustness
values was found to be negligible.
We now consider the Pareto fronts separately for different values of the mean degree.
3.2.1 Networks with intermediate mean degree 〈k〉 = 2.5
In Figure 9, the structure and parameters of optimized networks for 〈k〉 = 2.5 are depicted. The merging
procedure is reflected in the fact that the number of blocks indicated by the number indices on the axis
and the number of possible squares in the top-row Hinton-plots varies between one and three.
For RTargeted → 0 we recover the core-periphery structure found in Ref. [25] where the optimal
solution consists of only two blocks. One block is the very large periphery block which contains nearly
all the nodes (nperiphery ≈ 1) and which has the lowest mean degree possible in this kind of structure
〈k〉periphery ≈ 〈k〉/2 = 1.25. The core block contains only very few (ncore ∼ 10−3) but very high-degree
nodes (〈k〉core ∼ 103). Almost all of the edges are between the core and the periphery.
The core is central for forming the giant component, but takes up only a very small fraction of the
network. Therefore, random removal will almost always affect periphery nodes and the giant component
will shrink approximately linearly with the number of removed nodes, which is as slow as possible.
On the other hand, the core-periphery structure is maximally fragile with respect to targeted removal,
since removing the core completely removes the giant component.
With increasing robustness against targeted removal, a third block emerges for RTargeted & 0.07 in
addition to the core and periphery block. This new block, which we will call the secluded block is first
of medium size (nsecluded ≈ 0.16) and has a mean degree of 〈k〉secluded ≈ 4. In contrast to the core and
the periphery block, it has a substantial amount of edges internally, i.e. edges between nodes within this
block (green square in the Hinton plots). The secluded block is only lightly connected to the core block
and no edges exist between secluded and periphery block.
Increasing RTargeted further, the mean degree of the secluded block slightly decreases, while it grows
in size. The number of nodes in the periphery continuously decreases and around RTargeted ≈ 0.24 the
secluded block is larger than the periphery. For very high RTargeted & 0.52 the secluded block dominates
and the core periphery structure vanishes. The result is a single block network with a modified Poisson
degree distribution, as it was already mentioned in the discussion at the end of Section 3.1 in connection
with Fig. 8.
Considering the complete Pareto-optimal set of solutions, the dominant structure is a three-block
structure with a small but very high degree core, a large but low degree periphery and an additional
secluded block which has a medium mean degree. Connections only exist between the core and the
periphery, and between the core and the secluded block. The structure is best qualified as a modified
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Figure 4: Parameters of the optimized networks as a function of RTargeted obtained from a
three-block optimization with 〈k〉 = 2.5. The upper row shows the elements of the edge matrix ers,
where the areas of the squares is proportional to the logarithm of the element. The positions for which
these Hinton plots are shown are marked with dashed lines in the other panels. The second row shows
the trade-off curve already displayed in Fig. 7, while the third and fourth display the mean degree of
the blocks, on a logarithmic and a linear scale, respectively. The last row shows the relative sizes of the
blocks. The coloring of the blocks and their index is determined by their mean degree, where the block
with the highest mean degree is shown in blue and always has index r = 0, followed by green with r = 1
(second highest) and red (r = 2, lowest degree).
core-periphery with a regular Erdo˝s-Re´nyi network attached to the core. The relative size of the secluded
Erdo˝s-Re´nyi block compared to the core-periphery structure grows with an increased robustness against
targeted node removal.
3.2.2 Networks with low mean degree 〈k〉 = 2
The structures of Pareto-optimal networks with a low mean degree of 〈k〉 = 2 are shown in Figure 10.
The resulting structures are overall quite similar to the previously discussed case with 〈k〉 = 2.5. For
RTargeted → 0 a core-periphery structure results, with an additional secluded Erdo˝s-Re´nyi block emerging
as RTargeted is increased.
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Figure 5: Parameters of the networks along the trade-off curve for the five block optimization
with 〈k〉 = 2.0. The panels are the same as in Fig.9
However, a striking difference to the situation for 〈k〉 = 2.5 is that the number of edges within the
periphery does not vanish but is finite for all structures.
The periphery block always has a mean degree very close to one, 〈k〉periphery & 1, which implies that
the majority of nodes has exactly degree one. Therefore, most edges within the periphery produce an
isolated pair of two nodes not connected to any macroscopic component (cf. discussion of the modified
Poisson distribution in Section 2.1).
At first glance, this seems contradictory as the giant component is already reduced without any node
removal (q = 0). However, this is beneficial for the overall robustness as it allows for the rest of the nodes
to have a higher mean degree putting it further above the percolation threshold. As can be seen from
Fig. 1, this is especially effective for increasing the macroscopic component of the secluded block as its
mean degree of 〈k〉secluded ≈ 2.3 is close to the steep increase in the size of the giant component. On the
other hand, this may be viewed simply as an artifact of the specific constraints we have imposed. Perhaps
a more realistic scenario would be to impose additionally that the size of the largest component cannot
decrease for any value of q after the optimization. However, this would make the analysis significantly
more complicated, and would only affect the outcome of very sparse networks.
Interestingly, this holds for the two-block core-periphery structure as well for RTargeted = 0. A pure
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core-periphery structure is especially expected for 〈k〉 = 2, since then the extreme topology of a star can
be realized (the Hinton of which plot is not shown in Fig. 10). However, a very slight increase in the
robustness against targeted removal to RTargeted ≈ 0.006, leaves the two-block core-periphery structure
intact, but produces a significant amount of pairs in the periphery (see leftmost Hinton plot of Fig. 10).
The size of the core jumps from ncore ≈ 7× 10−5 to ncore ≈ 20× 10−5 while its mean degree is reduced
from 〈k〉core ≈ 14 × 103 to 〈k〉core ≈ 4.6 × 103. With this structural change, a little robustness against
random removal is lost, but the a finite number of edges is realized within the core which provides a finite
robustness against targeted removal.
As expected from the discussion at the end of Section 3.1, the structure with a maximal RTargeted
consists of two blocks, one with a mean degree 〈k〉0 > 〈k〉 and another with 〈k〉1 < 〈k〉. Both blocks
in fact form largely independent components since there are very few connections between them. This
is a situation similar to the “onion-like” structure found in Ref. [11] when optimizing against targeted
node removal while preserving a heterogeneous degree sequence. There, the nodes with higher degree are
kept isolated from the rest of the network, hence effectively functioning simply as “bait” for the targeted
removal, whereas the rest of the system remains intact.
It is very remarkable that for 〈k〉 = 2 the mean degree of the three blocks stay constant over the
complete range of the Pareto-optimal front (apart from the far extremes). The optimal trade-off between
the two robustness measures can be achieved by only changing the connection matrix and the relative
sizes of the blocks.
3.2.3 Networks with high mean degree 〈k〉 = 3.5
The network structures for a higher mean degree of 〈k〉 = 3.5 is shown in Fig. 11. The Pareto-optimal
part of the front, that is for RTargeted & 0.48, displays the same three-block structures as for 〈k〉 = 2.5
and also reduces to a single block for maximal RTargeted where RTargeted = RRandom (cf. Fig. 9).
For the part of the trade-off curve to the left of the maximum of RRandom (i.e. for RTargeted . 0.42),
the structures change significantly. A three-block structure prevails but the secluded block ceases to
exist. No block has a significant amount of internal edges and all edges connect different blocks. The
largest block incorporates most of the nodes, n & 0.9, and has the lowest mean degree of 〈k〉 ≈ 2. A
second block is very small with 10−5 < n < 10−2 and has a high degree 102 < 〈k〉 < 104 and therefore
strongly resembles the core block. The third block is of intermediate size and degree, 10−2 < n < 10−1
and 10 < 〈k〉 < 102, respectively. The midsized and the small block are only connected via the largest
block since there are no direct edges between them.
For very low robustness against targeted removal, RTargeted & 0, most of the edges are between the
core and the largest block with 〈k〉 = 2. With increasing robustness against targeted removal the number
of edges between core and the 〈k〉 = 2 block decreases while more edges emerge between the 〈k〉 = 2 block
and the midsized block. At around RTargeted ≈ 0.19 the same number of edges exist from the 〈k〉 = 2
block to both of the other two blocks. For higher RTargeted more edges exist between the 〈k〉 = 2 block
and the midsized block.
This structural evolution can be understood by noting that the largest part of the network always has
a mean degree very close to two and acts a connecting layer between the core and the midsized block.
For low RTargeted, very few edges are between the block with 〈k〉 = 2 and the midsized block, so that a
connecting path between two different nodes of the midsized block is very likely to traverse one of the
few core nodes. Therefore, removing the core quickly fragments the network into small components. On
the other hand, increasing the number of edges between the 〈k〉 = 2 and the midsized block, a connecting
path between nodes within the midsized block is more likely to involve no nodes from the core. The
core becomes increasingly unimportant and therefore the robustness with respect to targeted removal
increases.
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Figure 6: Parameters of the networks along the trade-off curve for the five block optimization
with 〈k〉 = 3.5. The panels are the same as in Fig.9.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we investigated the trade-offs between topological robustness of networks against random
and targeted node removals. We used the stochastic block model to parametrize arbitrary mixing patterns,
and a multi-objective optimization algorithm to obtain the Pareto-optimal fronts. It was found that in
order to achieve a Pareto-optimal combination of robustness against random and targeted removal, a
network composed of at most three different blocks is sufficient. In many cases the networks along the
Pareto-optimal fronts are composed of a hybrid topology, comprised of a core-periphery structure, in
addition to a secluded group, which is only sparsely connected to the core of the network, and not at all
with the periphery.
At the edges of the Pareto-fronts, where one of the two robustness criteria is maximized, one or two
blocks suffice to obtain optimal networks: A two-block structure is maximally robust against random
failure, and a fully random network with one block is sufficient in the case of targeted removal. This
reproduces the results of Ref. [25], and is also consistent with the earlier findings of Valente et al. [26]
who found two- or three-peak degree distributions to be optimal when minimizing percolation thresholds,
with networks which are otherwise fully random.
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For low mean degrees of the overall network, the optimal robustness values are generally lower than
for higher mean degrees and a significant trade-off exists between robustness against random and targeted
removal. With increasing mean degree the strong trade-off diminishes and it is increasingly possible to
obtain a high robustness with respect to both criteria. This implies that a network optimized against
one type of failure does not necessarily lose much of its robustness when it is subsequently optimized
against the other type of failure or attack. Hence this shows that increasing the overall connectivity of the
network not only has the expected trivial effect of increasing each robustness criterion individually, but to
a large extent also allows for them to be fulfilled simultaneously. This suggests that the simple strategy of
increasing the total number of edges in the network, if combined with the optimal large-scale structures
present in the Pareto-optimal front, can be much more beneficial than could be expected otherwise.
A comparison of the large-scale structures we find with the ones observed in empirical systems [?,31,42]
is a natural and important extension of this work, and one we intend to pursue in the future. The most
appropriate approach is to search for precisely the same type of model we are using in the analysis,
which can be done by inferring the parameters of the stochastic block model itself from empirical data,
which is a very active field of research [32,33,43,44]. In fact, core-periphery structures have already been
detected, such as the topology of the internet at the autonomous systems level presented recently in [?].
However, to our knowledge, an empirical verification of the specific structures we have found has not yet
been made.
In this work we have considered maximally robust networks that are obtained when very few con-
straints are imposed. This gives us fundamental limits on the multi-objective optimization against random
failures and targeted attacks. However, in empirical systems, exogenous constraints are almost always
present, such as geographical confinement, and restrictions due to functional performance. In previous
studies [11,45], the optimization against targeted node removal was considered when the degree sequence
of an empirical network is preserved. It was found that an assortative structure emerges as the optimum
in this case, where nodes become connected with other nodes with similar degree. This has been obtained
as well by imposing similar constraints with the block model approach in Ref [25]. However, it is still
unknown how the multi-objective optimization would behave when these constraints (and other more
realistically motivated ones) are simultaneously imposed. We leave these questions for future work.
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